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5 6	Attorneys for Defendants BLUE ROCK CAPITAL, LTD., ESPRO INVESTMEN LTD., and PRASANTH SEEVNARAYA	TS, N
7 8 9		ED DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	UNITED MEDICAL DEVICES, LLC, a California limited liability company, UNITED CONVENIENCE SUPPLY LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company,  Plaintiffs,  v.  BLUE ROCK CAPITAL, LTD., a Mauritius Limited Liability Company; ESPRO INVESTMENTS, LTD., a Mauritius Limited Liability Company; PRASANTH SEEVNARYAN, an individual; and DOES 1-50,  Defendants.	Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-01255-PSG-SSX  NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 12 (b)(6)  [MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(6) FILED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH]  Date: April 18, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. Ctrm: 880 Roybal Federal Building  Judge: Hon. Philip S. Gutierrez
<ul><li>23</li><li>24</li><li>25</li><li>26</li><li>27</li></ul>	Edward R. Roybal Federal Building, 255	April 18, 2016, at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom 880, East Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012-L, LTD., and ESPRO INVESTMENTS, LTD.,
28	will illove this Court for all order distillssi	1

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12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that it does not comply 1 2 with the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as each purported claim lack essential elements 3 4 constituting a viable claim. This motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of 5 6 Points and Authorities, and upon such other and further oral or documentary evidence as 7 may be presented at the hearing. 8 This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-9 3, which took place on February 25, 2016. 10 GORDON & GORDON A Professional Law Corporation. 11 12 Dated: February 28, 2016 13 Bv: 14 Attorney for BLUE ROCK CAPITAL. LTD., ESPRO INVESTMENTS, LTD., 15 and PRASANTH SEEVNARAYAN 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 4 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 5550 Topanga Canyon 5 Boulevard, Suite 200, Woodland Hills, California 91367-6478. 6 On February 29, 2016, I served the foregoing documents described as: 7 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 8 PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 12 (b)(6) 9 [MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(6) FILED 10 CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH 11 on the interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows: 12 Michael J. Perry, Esq. 13 4640 Admiralty Way, Suite 500 Marina del Rey, California 90292 14 15 Peter W. Ross Brown George Ross LLP 2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2400 16 Los Angeles, CA 90067 17 I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing 18 correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Woodland Hills, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party 19 served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is 20 more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. 21 Executed on February 29, 2016, at Woodland Hills, California 22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America 23 that the foregoing is true and correct, and that I am employed in the office of a member of 24 the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made. 30rdon 25 26 27 Linda Gordon 28

PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(6)

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#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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#### I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

4 This is the companion motion filed concurrently with defendant PRASANTH 5 SEEVNARYAN's motion for orders quashing service of the summons and complaint on 6 him, and to dismiss the summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. This 7 motion attacks the sufficiency of the two separate claims for breach of a written 8 Distribution Agreement that plaintiffs UNITED MEDICAL DEVICES, LLC ("UMD") 9 and UNITED CONVENIENCE SUPPLY LLC, ("UCS") filed against defendants BLUE 10 ROCK CAPITAL, LTD., ("BLUE ROCK"), ESPRO INVESTMENTS, LTD., ("ESPRO") and PRASANTH SEEVNARAYAN ("SEEVNARAYAN"). Significantly, 12 the plaintiffs have studiously avoided attaching a copy of the Distribution Agreement to 13 the complaint, and by this motion, the moving parties BLUE ROCK and ESPRO move to 14 dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state viable claims upon which relief can be granted. 15

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#### II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

Legal Standard under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) 1.

The federal pleading standards for notice pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "are not so liberal as to allow purely conclusory statements to suffice to state a claim that can survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). '[T]he court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the fact alleged. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network. 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994.)

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. "A claim for breach of contract must include facts demonstrating (1) that a contract exists between the parties; (2) that the plaintiff performed his contractual duties or was excused from non-performance; (3) that

the defendant breached those contractual duties; and (4) that plaintiff's damages were a result of the breach. [Citation omitted.] *Walters v. Fidelity Mortgage of CA.*, 30 F.Supp.2d. 1185. 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2010.)

"A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms – set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference or by its legal effect." *Smith v. U.S. Bank,* 2012 WL 10634241 (C.D. Cal. 2012; "In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must allege substance of its relevant terms, which is more difficult because the plaintiff must engage in careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.' *Id.* (quoting 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1997) Pleading § 480, p. 573.)" *McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc.,* 142 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1457, 1489 (2006.)

### 2. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Plead Facts That Support Viable Claims For Breach of Written Contract

Plaintiffs generally allege that all defendants signed and entered into the Distribution Agreement. See Complaint ¶ 15 ["Plaintiffs on the one hand and defendants on the other signed a written ten year distribution agreement..."]. But the Complaint does not specifically identify which defendants were parties to the Distribution Agreement. Nor does it allege specifically which terms of the written agreement were breached, and in what way.

# 3. Plaintiffs' Complaint Should Be Dismissed Because it Fails to Identify Which Defendants Were Parties to the Contract

The first element of a breach of contract claim is that a contract exists between the parties. Walters v. Fidelity Mortgage of CA., 730 F.Supp.2d. 1185. 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2010). The Complaint is intentionally vague in that it fails to identify which of the defendants were parties to the written Distribution Agreement. While plaintiffs attempt to entangle defendant SEEVNARYAN as a party to the Distribution Agreement, the complaint lacks any specific allegation that he was a party to the Distribution Agreement.

Plaintiffs also do not identify the specific terms of the agreement that they contend

defendants breached, other than to state that "Defendants breached the Distribution Agreement as set forth in paragraph 16 above." See Complaint, ¶ 29.

Paragraph 16 alleges no more than that "[t]he Distribution Agreement contains the representations, conditions, and promises by defendants that they will, among other things: Have minimum net sales of US \$500,000 of Playboy Condoms in India per year; Purchase a minimum of US \$1,000,000 of Playboy Vapor from UCS for India per year; Purchase a minimum of US \$1,200,000 of Playboy Vapor from UCS for Africa per year; Purchase a minimum of 2 containers of Playboy Lubricants for Africa per year." See Complaint, ¶ 16.

The Complaint fails not only to identify the specific provisions of the Distribution Agreement which defendants allegedly breached, but it also fails to include the express language of the Distribution Agreement. The extent of plaintiffs' factual allegations is that defendants allegedly failed to satisfy certain "representations, conditions and promises" that are not factually supported by the exact wording of the Distribution Agreement. See Complaint ¶17. ["Defendants breached the Distribution Agreement by failing to satisfy the conditions set forth in Paragraph 16 of this Complaint."].

Because plaintiffs do not provide sufficient facts showing in what way each of the defendants breached a specific term of the written the Distribution Agreement, the Complaint does not state a claim for breach of contract. *Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, No. C-11-02279 JCS, 2011 WL 3809808, at \*18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) [dismissing contract claim where the plaintiff failed to identify a "specific contractual provision allegedly breached"]; *McAfee v. Francis*, No. 5:11-cv-00821-LHK, 2011 WL 3293759, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) ["Without the essential terms of the agreement and more specific allegations as to the breach, plaintiffs fail to state breach of contract claims."].

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that show how or in what way BLUE ROCK and ESPRO breached the express terms of the Distribution Agreement.

# 4. Pleading a Breach of Contract Cause of Action Requires an Attached Contract or Verbatim Terms

In an absence of pleading the terms of the written agreement verbatim, the plaintiffs are required to attach what they allege to be their contract with defendants. Instead of doing either, they attempt to cobble together alleged "representations, conditions and promises" in an attempt to avoid providing the express terms of the Distribution Agreement, which leaves it to the defendants to speculate as to what duties each defendant allegedly owed under the contract. Because the Complaint does not clearly allege the substance of the relevant terms of the Distribution Agreement, defendants do not have reasonable notice of the claims against them, and the Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of contract.

# III. PLAINTIFFS' ALTER-EGO THEORY LACKS SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS

"The term 'alter ego' refers to a doctrine of corporation law under which courts may at times disregard the corporate entities. If plaintiffs wish to pursue such a theory of liability, they must allege the elements of the doctrine. Conclusory allegations of alter ego status such as those made in the present complaint are not sufficient." *Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 556* F. Supp. 636, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1983.) "Rather a plaintiff must allege specifically both of the elements of alter ego liability, as well as facts supporting each." *Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A.*, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2003.)

Relying on exactly the sort of conclusory allegations that these cases found to be deficient, plaintiffs allege that defendant BLUE ROCK, ESPRO, and SEEVNARYAN are all alter-egos of one another. See Complaint. ¶ 12, which provides:

"Defendants are the alter egos of each other and/or are liable to plaintiffs under the single enterprise doctrine. The companies are participating in a common business venture. The companies sell the same products. The companies have common owners and employees. The companies share business locations, telephone numbers,

a website and email systems. Each company is merely the instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of the others. There is such a unity of interest and ownership between the defendant companies and their individual defendants that their separate personalities have ceased to exist. Further Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that, if the acts of any one of the companies are treated as those of that company alone, an inequitable result will follow."

These above allegations do not meet the pleading requirements for alter ego liability. Each of these "legal conclusions" is unsupported by the "evidentiary" allegations required to sustain such a claim. Furthermore, as stated in *Sandoval v. Ali*, 34 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2014), "California courts have rejected, however, the view that the potential difficulty a plaintiff faces collecting a judgment is an inequitable result that warrants application of the alter ego doctrine. *Neilson*, 290 F.Supp.2d 1101 at 1117; see also *Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Sup.Ct.*, 83 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 523, 539 (2000) ('The alter ego doctrine does not guard every unsatisfied creditor of a corporation but instead affords protection where some conduct amounting to bad faith makes it inequitable for the corporate owner to hide behind the corporate form. Difficulty in enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy this standard.')"

Plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith on defendants' part is vague and conclusory, unsupported by specific facts, and is implausible on its face. Plaintiffs allege that defendants used "limited company forms for their own personal benefit and to avoid creditors and personal liability for their own wrongdoings." See Complaint, ¶ 8. There are no specific allegations of this ever occurring, and the Complaint fails to identify any purportedly unsatisfied creditors. It also fails to allege which subsidiaries plaintiffs claim engaged in wrongdoings. Instead, plaintiff pleads conclusions without any supporting factual details as required by Rule 8 of the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure.

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### IV. **CONCLUSION** For the reasons stated above, defendants BLUE ROCK and ESPRO respectfully request that the Court dismiss the stated claims in the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. GORDON & GORDON Professional Law Corporation. Dated: February 29, 2016 By: Attorney for BLUE ROCK CAPITAL, LTD., ESPRO INVESTMENTS, LTD., and PRASANTH SEEVNARAYAN

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 4 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 5550 Topanga Canyon 5 Boulevard, Suite 200, Woodland Hills, California 91367-6478. 6 On February 29, 2016, I served the foregoing documents described as: 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 8 TO DISMISS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(6) 9 [NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(6) FILED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH 10 on the interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed 11 envelope addressed as follows: 12 Michael J. Perry, Esq. 4640 Admiralty Way, Suite 500 13 Marina del Rey, California 90292 14 Peter W. Ross Brown George Ross LLP 15 2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, CA 90067 16 17 I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. 18 Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Woodland Hills, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party 19 served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. 20 21 Executed on February 29, 2016, at Woodland Hills, California 22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct, and that I am employed in the office of a member of 23 the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made. gordon 24 25 26 Linda Gordon 27 28